This study examines the intersection of youth joblessness, informal digital labour, and patronage politics in contemporary Nigeria through the phenomenon popularly known as "Data Boys." While recent scholarship demonstrates that Data Boys are deployed to promote, rehabilitate, and sustain the public image of Nigerian political leaders, the wider socio-economic conditions that facilitate their recruitment remain underexplored. Concurrently, official labour data indicate that informal employment remains pervasive in Nigeria and that youth labour-market insecurity persists, even where headline unemployment figures appear lower under revised measurement standards. This study argues that these two discourses—digital political influence and youth precarity—must be analysed concurrently rather than in isolation. Anchored in the political economy of digital labour, precarity theory, and clientelism, this study conceptualises Data Boys as a form of informal political digital labour situated at the nexus of online hustling, selective reward, and elite demand for narrative control. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative-dominant, mixed-methods approach, combining netnographic observation of political activity on X (formerly Twitter), manual content analysis of campaign-linked digital artefacts, and semi-structured interviews with key actors familiar with Nigeria’s digital political sphere. This design moves beyond surface-level descriptions of political posting to critically examine recruitment pathways, reward structures, tactical repertoires, and participants’ moral rationalisations of their work. The study contends that for-hire political influence in Nigeria is sustained by a recruitable pool of digitally skilled but economically insecure youth who convert visibility, loyalty, and online persuasive capacity into cash, data stipends, access, and future political opportunities. Consequently, the Data Boys phenomenon is not merely an issue of communication ethics; it is fundamentally a labour-market and governance crisis. By masquerading organised influence as organic public opinion, it erodes transparency in the digital public sphere and blurs the distinction between genuine civic voice and patronage-driven amplification. The study concludes that interventions limited to fact-checking, platform moderation, or speech regulation are insufficient unless they address systemic youth precarity, political finance opacity, and the informal digital economies that increasingly shape democratic communication in Nigeria.